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Parent-Child Tort Immunity
Along with the evolution of the family unit, society has willingly
accepted the premise that parents have absolute power over their une-
mancipated children. In ancient times, parental authority was uncon-
ditional and parents were granted the power of life and death over their
minor children. As late as the eighteenth century, Americans recognized
a parent's right to unquestioned authority and by the late nineteenth
century, the American courts developed the doctrine of parent-child tort
immunity. The doctrine was designed to exempt parents from personal
liability for tortious acts they committed against their minor child. As
the doctrine of parental immunity evolved, the courts began to articulate
several rationales in justification of its application. Because the appli-
cation of the doctrine often resulted in harsh inequities, the courts were
then forced to carve out exceptions.
Twentieth century courts have moved to protect individual rights
and, as a result, the child in modern society enjoys a better legal status
then did his predecessor. Several states have recognized the need to
reexamine the parent-child immunity doctrine and have abrogated the
doctrine in favor of the "reasonable parent" standard.
This discussion of parent-child tort immunity will include five sec-
tions: 1) a historical look at the parent-child relationship; 2) a discussion
of the rationales behind the doctrine of parent-child immunity; 3) the
exceptions carved out by the courts; 4) the doctrine as it stands in
Louisiana law; and 5) the abrogation of the doctrine and adoption of
the reasonable and prudent parent standard.
HISToRIcAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD
As far back as Roman times the father, or paterfamilias, as head
of the family unit, had complete authority over the members of the
family. This absolute authority was called potestas and extended not
only to the right to sell an unemancipated child but included the power
of life or death. While Roman law allowed for compensation for personal
injuries tortiously committed, it was impossible for a paterfamilias to
incur any liability for wrongful injury to his child. Additionally, an
unemancipated Roman child was incapable of owning property and any
property a child acquired would automatically revert to the ownership
of the father. Therefore, even if a child were able to bring an action
against the father, any compensation would revert back to the pater-
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familias. In effect, the father had a "de facto" immunity by virtue of
the fact that the child was unable to own any property.'
Eventually, the absolute power of the paterfamilias was restricted.
The parent no longer had the power of life or death over his child.
Only the very poor were allowed to sell their children. Legal sanctions
for child abuse were enacted, but they were rarely imposed.
With the emergence of Christianity in the Middle Ages, the status
of the child improved ever so slightly. The child could own separate
property and society began to recognize the need for moral and legal
sanctions against abusive parents.
In Colonial America, the child was viewed as stained and sinful. It
was the duty of every parent to be stern in order to rid his child of
vices, particularly the sins of pride and disobedience. 2 The belief in
near-absolute parental authority was strongly evidenced by laws in Mas-
sachusetts and Connecticut, which provided that a child who was stub-
born or rebellious or cursed and struck his parents could be executed.3
While parents were encouraged to strictly discipline the evil child, the
law did provide penalties if a parent acted unreasonably in the exercise
of discipline. In reality the parent had few bounds and incurred no
liability unless he acted with malice or inflicted permanent injury.
For example, the 1837 case of Johnson v. State4 described a parent
who punched his child, pushed her head against the wall, tied her to
the bed for two hours, and hit her with cowhide. The court declared
that the reasonableness of the actions was a question of fact for the
jury to decide. Fifty years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court
would declare that a father who hit his daughter thirty times with a
small limb, choked her until her tongue hung out of her mouth, and
threw her violently to the ground dislocating her thumb, could not be
found criminally liable.' A bizarre South Carolina statute6 enacted in
1712 seems to permit a parent to correct his children by stabbing them
and provides that if a child is accidentally killed, the parent would not
be criminally responsible. 7
In those cases where a parent was held legally accountable for injuries
inflicted upon his or her child, the penalties afforded the child little
protection. The parent was either separated from the child, leaving the
1. G. Leslie, The Family in Social Context 168-70 (2d ed. 1973).
2. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search of Justification, 50 For-
dham L. Rev. 489, 491 (1982).
3. The Family in History 42 (C. Rosenberg ed. 1975).
4. 21 Tenn. 282, 284 (1837).
5. State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588, 591-92 (1886).
6. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
7. Hollister, supra note 2, at 492 n.26 (1982).
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family with no means of support, or fined. If the child had not died,
fines were more often imposed rather than jail terms.'
In Fletcher v. People,9 the court imposed a $300 fine when a parent
doused a child with kerosene to rid him of vermin and then kept the
child in the cellar for several days in the dead of winter. In State v.
Washington,I° the court fined a parent $20 for beating a child with a
switch and thereby permanently scarring him. A Texas jury, in Snowden
v. State," imposed a $25 fine for aggravated assault and battery.' 2
THE Six RATIONALES
In view of the absolute authority a parent exercised over his minor
child, it was impossible to imagine that a child would have any cause
of action against a tortious parent. In 1891, however, such a claim was
before the Mississippi Supreme Court and it first articulated the doctrine
of parent-child tort immunity. In Hewlette v. George,3 a minor daughter,
who was married but separated from her husband and had returned to
her mother's home, attempted to sue the estate of her deceased mother
for wrongful confinement to an insane asylum. The daughter claimed
damages for the amount expended in obtaining her release, the value
of her time in confinement and mental suffering, shame, mortification
and injury to character.14
The court reversed the trial court judgment in favor of the daughter
and held that while the daughter's damages were real, by returning to
the mother's home after her separation, she was under the care and
guidance of her parent and could not maintain an action against her
mother. The court reasoned:
The peace of society, and of the families composing society,
and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of
families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor
child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to
civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the
parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor
child protection from parental violence and wrong-doing, and
this is all the child can be heard to demand."
8. Id. at 492.
9. 52 Ill. 395 (1869).
10. 104 La. 443, 29 So. 55 (1900).
It. 12 Tex. Crim. 105 (1882).
12. Hollister, supra note 2, at 492 n.30.
13. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
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The courts did not address the issue of parental tort immunity again
until 1903. In the case of McKelvey v. McKelvey,' 6 a minor son sought
to recover damages from his father and stepmother for cruel and in-
humane treatment. The Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld a lower
court's dismissal of the cause..of action. The court relied heavily on the
"peace of society" reasoning of the Hewlette court but added the
following further justification:
[Tihe right of the father to the control and custody of his infant
child grew out of a corresponding duty to maintain, protect and
educate .... The right to control involved the subordinate right
to restrain and inflict moderate chastisement upon the child. In
case parental power was abused, the child had no civil remedy
against the father for the personal injuries inflicted.'7
The court further reasoned that the parent-child relationship is anal-
ogous to the husband-wife relationship:
[Tihe husband was the guardian of the wife and was bound to
protect and maintain her, and on that ground the law gave him
reasonable superiority and control over her person, authorized
him to put gentle restraints upon her liberty if her conduct was
such to require it.'
The court noted that the proper action by a wife for unreasonable
restraint by her husband was by writ of habeas corpus. This comparison
of spousal immunity to parental immunity had no legal basis and was
in fact erroneous for several reasons. First, the contract of marriage is
entered into voluntarily whereas children do not select their parents.
Second, the relationship of husband and wife is theoretically for life,
while the parental authority lasts only until the child reaches majority.
Third, the parent acquires no legal right to the property of his minor
child, but acts only as guardian. Finally, the wife had no legal standing.
She was considered one unit with her husband and could not sue or
be sued or enter into contracts. The child was considered a legal entity
and could exercise his status except for the right to sue his parent for
tortious misconduct. 9
The final case to firmly entrench the parent-child tort immunity
doctrine firmly in American jurisprudence was Roller v. Roller.20 In this
case a minor daughter brought an action against her father for the
crime of rape. The father had been criminally convicted and was serving
16. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
17. Id. at 389-90, 77 S.W. at 664.
18. Id. at 391-92, 77 S.W. at 665 (citation omitted).
19. McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 Viii. L. Rev. 521, 523-24 (1960).
20. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
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time in the state penitentiary. The daughter sought damages of $2,000
and the family homestead in which she and her siblings were living.
The court realized it could not rely on the theory that parental immunity
was necessary to maintain the harmony of the family or was required
to protect parental rights to discipline. Instead the court again fell into
the trap of analogizing the parental immunity to interspousal immunity.
It added that if the child were allowed to recover damages from the
tortfeasor parent and that child predeceased the parent, the offending
parent would stand to inherit from the child and thereby profit from
his wrongdoing. The court further explained:
the public has an interest in the financial welfare of other minor
members of the family, and it would not be the policy of the
law to allow the estate, which is looked to for the support of
all the minor children, to be appropriated by any particular
one.
2
'
These three cases firmly established the doctrine of parent-child tort
immunity in American law. In summary, the caselaw articulated six
rationales that made the doctrine necessary: 1) the need to maintain
domestic tranquility and harmony; 2) the need to insure the parents'
right to discipline, care, and control; 3) the need to avoid the depletion
of the family's assets; 4) the possibility of parental inheritance of the
child's recovery; 5) the possibility of fraud and collusion among family
members; and 6) the analogy to spousal immunity. 21 More than fifty
years passed before a state finally abolished this bright-line doctrine in
favor of an approach that considered individualized factors of the case
at hand to determine if the rationales for the doctrine applied.2 3 As the
children continued to contest the issue, courts found it necessary to
critically evaluate the rationales and to carve out exceptions.
The most plausible of the six justifications is the necessity to maintain
tranquility, peace, and harmony in the family. However, as Gail Hollister
points out:
The refusal to permit the injured party to sue does not eliminate
the conflict. The loss, and thus the conflict, exists regardless of
the immunity: "[Ilt is the injury itself which is the disruptive
act." To prohibit suit in the name of domestic harmony is to
21. Id. at 245, 79 P. 789.
22. Journal of Family Law 315, 315-16 (1984-85).
23. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963) (cited in Hollister,
supra note 2, at 512). The court stated that the doctrine would only apply where the
negligent act involved an exercise of parental authority or an exercise of ordinary parental
discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medicine and dental
services, and other care.
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allege "that an uncompensated tort makes for peace in the
family." 2
4
She goes on to argue that to deny the child the right to sue the
parent shifts the burden of the loss to the innocent victim instead of
to the tortfeasor. Forcing the child to go uncompensated is more likely
to produce disharmony. Furthermore, the existence of liability insurance
in many cases would alleviate the financial burden for many parents
when a child is negligently injured. Hollister also points out that the
courts have always allowed a child to sue a parent in matters of property
or contract disputes. There is no evidence that a tort action between
parent and child would be any more disruptive than a property or
contract action.
Finally, the courts do nothing to protect the harmony of the family
if the rights of a third party are at stake. If a child should witness the
parent's tortious injury of a third party, the court does not protect the
child from testifying against the parent in the litigation. "If the fear
of disharmony in the family is insufficient to prevent a third party from
subjecting families to the friction inherent in litigation by requiring a
child to testify against his parents, it should not be sufficient to prevent
the injured child from deciding to seek compensation for his injuries. '2
The second argument in favor of parental immunity is the necessity
to protect a parent's right to control and discipline his child. Perhaps
it is believed that to allow suit between parent and child would undermine
the parent's authority over the child. One might legitimately argue that
the parent has the privilege to discipline his child without fear of reprisal
from the court. Parents, however, do not have unchecked discretion in
disciplining their children. This is evidenced by the fact that a parent
may be deprived of his parental rights or criminally prosecuted for
overstepping the bounds of reasonableness and causing injury to his
child. It is also argued that if the immunity is not allowed, parents
who choose to raise their children in a less conventional manner could
become victims of juries who disapprove of their methods even though
they are not tortious. It should also be noted that the exercise of
discipline is an intentional act-one does not accidentally discipline a
child-and intentional injuries have been found to be an exception to
the parental immunity rule.
The court in Roller declared the third justification to be the need
to protect the family treasury for the innocent members of the family.
While this may appear to be an altruistic motive, it is in fact unfounded
24. Hollister, supra note 2, at 502 (quoting Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282
A.2d 351 (1971) and W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 122 at 856 (4th ed.
1971), respectively).
25. Hollister, supra note 2, at 504,
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for several reasons. Primarily, as was mentioned previously, the law has
always allowed a child to recover damages from a parent in cases of
property litigation and contract disputes with little regard for the de-
pletion of the family coffer. The states have had no problem fining
parents prosecuted for criminal wrongdoing against a child. These fines
have, of course, depleted the family treasury to the detriment of the
innocent siblings. This kind of liability should not be viewed differently
simply because the money inures to the benefit of the state and not to
the injured child. Further, if a parent were to injure a third party, he
would be liable to that person for damages. In such an instance the
innocent family members are not financially protected. It is unreasonable
to expect a child, because of his family status, to go uncompensated
for his injuries so that his siblings might be protected. No child has an
automatic right to the property of his parents. It can also be argued
that the injured child is not being favored over his siblings but is being
equitably compensated for his damages. Finally, in some instances there
are no siblings to protect. Parents should not enjoy the benefit of the
immunity when the rationale does not apply.
If a child were allowed to sue a parent, the availability of liability
insurance would actually work to the benefit of the family's finances
by relieving the parents of expenditures for the injured child. It is
recognized that the availability of insurance may increase the likelihood
of fraud and conspiracy against an insurer. That possibility, however,
is reduced if the insured must cooperate with the insurer in his defense.
It hardly seems fair to deny all claimants because some may engage in
unlawful collusion.
The fourth justification for the doctrine is the possibility that the
parent might stand to benefit from his tort by inheriting from the
injured child should the child predecease him. In the unlikely event that
a compensated child dies before the parent, the parent is not profiting
from the tort, but is having his expenditure returned. If the damages
were paid by insurance, the better solution would be to deny the parent
the right to inherit these particular funds instead of denying recovery
to the one injured. In addition, if the child dies because of the injuries
inflicted by the tortious parent, the wrongful death laws would prevent
the parent from recovering.
Tm EXCEPTIONS
Because the rationales used to justify parental tort immunity led to
such inequity, the courts were forced to carve out exceptions to the
rule. Those states that still adhere to the doctrine employ one or more
of the following exceptions: 1) If the parent's misconduct is willful and
wanton, the courts have reasoned that the sanction of such conduct
does nothing to foster family unity and simply denies an injured child
1990] 1137
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redress. 2) If the cause of the injury is "beyond the family purpose"
the jurisprudence holds that the immunity will not apply. The reasoning
is that the doctrine protects only that "conduct which arises from the
family relationship and is directly related to family purposes and ob-
jectives. ' 26 This exception encompasses those situations where the parent-
child relationship is that of employer-employee. 3) Some states recognize
the "public duty exception" to the immunity doctrine. This is applied
when the duty the parent breaches is owed to the general public and
not just to the child. 4) Death is also held to be an exception to the
rule. Because the doctrine is based on the parent-child relationship and
the desire to maintain the harmony of that relationship, the doctrine
does not apply when a child is suing the estate of a deceased parent
or the estate of a deceased child is suing the tortious parent. 5) Some
states have abrogated the doctrine if the parents are divorced or separated
and the non-custodial parent is the offender. 6) The courts have been
forced to make an exception when a defendant third party is a negligent
parent in a claim for contribution. 7) The courts in some states have
refused to extend the privilege to those standing in the role of the parent
(in loco parentis). 8) Other states have held that where the parent is
protected by liability insurance, the immunity cannot be claimed; the
theory is that a claim covered by insurance will not deplete the family
resources or disrupt its harmony.
TiE DOCTRINE IN LOUISIANA
In Louisiana, the doctrine has received both jurisprudential and
legislative attention. As early as 1850, in Bird v. Black, the supreme
court observed that
The decisions of this court have not encouraged suits of children
against their parents, unless to redress clear and palpable in-
justice. There are services which parents render to their children,
and which it is presumed they perform until the contrary appears,
which money cannot pay; and filial duty should restrain the
child from exposing the faults of its parents, or worrying them
with litigation, unless compelled by extreme necessity.27
This case involved a daughter who sued her mother for misman-
agement of her estate while she was a minor. In disallowing the claim,
the court relied on the rationale that the immunity was necessary to
protect family tranquility and harmony. The court seemed to imply that
if the parental misconduct was such a "clear and palpable injustice"
26. Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity in Illinois, 17 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 303,
314 (1986).
27. Bird v. Black, 5 La. Ann. 189, 196 (1850) (emphasis added).
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that the child was "compelled by extreme necessity" to seek relief, the
action should have been allowed. Thus the court carved out the first
exception to the doctrine.
The supreme court again addressed the issue in the 1935 case of
Ruiz v. Clancey.2s This case involved a suit brought by minor children
against the administrator of their father's succession. The claim was for
the loss of companionship and for grief due to the death of their mother
caused by their father's negligent operation of an automobile. The
defendants claimed the children had no cause or right of action, citing
the Code of Practice: "Children, as long as they are subjected to paternal
power, that is to say, while their fathers and mothers are living and
they not emancipated, can not bring suit against them.''29 The court
duly noted that the language of the article implied that an unemancipated
child, through an action by a tutrix, may bring suit against the succession
of a deceased parent.
The protection afforded a tortious parent was statutorily confirmed
by 1960 Louisiana Acts No. 31. Upon recommendation of the Louisiana
State Law Institute, the legislature transferred the provisions of Article
104, Code of Practice to the Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:571, which
reads:
The child who is not emancipated cannot sue:
(1) Either parent during the continuance of their marriage,
when the parents are not judicially separated; or
(2) The parent who is entitled to his custody and control,
when the marriage of the parents is dissolved, or the parents
are judicially separated.
It should be noted that while the new statute does not carry the language
"while their mothers and fathers are living," it is understood that if
either parent is dead there is no "continuance of their marriage." 30
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Johnson v. Housing Au-
thority of New Orleans,3 ' held that a parent could assert the immunity
against third party demafnds made by joint-tortfeasors. The case involved
an action by a parent against his landlord for injuries sustained when
his minor child fell from an open porch. The landlord claimed the
parent was contributorily negligent and third-partied the parent for con-
tribution. The court reasoned that had the child directed the action
against the landlord and the parent in solido, the parent could have
28. Ruiz v. Clancey, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).
29. La. Code of Prac. art. 104 (1932).
30. Id.
31. Johnson v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 163 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
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successfully asserted the immunity defense. Therefore, the court held
that:
To allow the defendants [landlord] herein to prosecute their
demands for indemnification or contribution against the parents
would in effect be investing a wrongdoer, as against the co-
tortfeasor, with a greater right than the tort victim has.
3 2
In 1972, the Louisiana Supreme Court was forced to overrule John-
son and further compromise the doctrine in the case of Walker v.
Milton.33 The father of two minor children sought damages for injuries
sustained by his children in an automobile accident. The mother was
the driver of the vehicle that collided with a truck. The father sued the
truck driver and his insurer. In turn, the truck driver sued the mother
for contribution based on her contributory negligence. In this case, the
court held that the statute did not destroy the substantive causes of
action arising between parent and child, but only acted as a procedural
bar. Therefore, contribution was allowed in favor of the joint tortfeasor-
truck driver.
The final case to examine the doctrine in Louisiana was Bondurant
v. Bondurant.34 The mother, on behalf of her minor children, filed a
tort action against the father for injuries sustained by the children while
in the care of the father. The father filed an exception of no right of
action claiming the parental immunity. The parents were judicially sep-
arated prior to the accident and the mother was the custodial parent
at the time of the accident. The court applied the second paragraph of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:571, which provides that a child who is
not emancipated cannot sue "[tihe parent who is entitled to his custody
and control, when the marriage of the parents is dissolved, or the parents
are judicially separated." The court held that because the parents were
judicially separated and the mother had custody of the children, the
father could not claim the immunity.
In addition to the exceptions recognized in the jurisprudence, there
is the exception dictated by the Louisiana Direct Action Statute." The
right of direct action allows a plaintiff in a tort action to bring an
action for damages directly against the insurer without naming the
insured tortfeasor. This works to the advantage of the plaintiff in those
cases where the defendant would be personally immune from suit because
the insurer is unable to assert any defenses that are personal to the
insured.
32. Id. at 570.
33. Walker v. Milton, 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972).
34. Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
35. La. R.S. 22:655 (1978 and Supp. 1989).
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In 1988, however, the legislature rewrote the statute eliminating the
right of direct action with certain exceptions. One of these exceptions
is intended to protect the right of a minor to sue directly the insurer
of the offending parent without having to name the insured parent. The
statute, effective as of January 1, 1989, reads that an action may be
brought against the insurer alone only when "the cause of action is for
damages as a result of an offense or quasi-offense between children and
their parents or between married persons." In effect, this creates the
fourth exception to the parent-child tort immunity doctrine by allowing
suit in those cases where there is liability insurance to cover the damages
caused by a parent's misconduct.
In summary, Louisiana courts have articulated at least four excep-
tions to the immunity doctrine: 1) if the misconduct is such a "clear
and palpable injustice; ' 3 6 2) if the offending parent is third partied by
a joint tortfeasor;3 7 3) if the offending parent is the noncustodial parent;38
and 4) if there is liability insurance to cover the damages caused by a
parent's misconduct in a direct action against the insurer.
THE REASONABLY PRUDENT PARENT STANDARD
To date, the doctrine has been totally abrogated in ten states and
partially abrogated in twenty-six states. Curiously, five states never adopted
the doctrine in any form.39 The courts in those states that still adhere
to the doctrine have had an increasingly difficult time justifying the
immunity and have been forced to resort to exceptions to the rule.
Instead, the "reasonable and prudent parent" standard should be adopted
as the method of determining parental liability in tort actions. This
would allow a child or a third party to recover damages if the parent
failed to meet the standard of care required of all parents.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court is credited with leading the way in
abolishing the immunity. In the case of Goller v. White, 4° the plaintiff-
son filed suit against the father for injuries sustained in a tractor accident.
The court allowed recovery stating that the injurious conduct of a parent
could only be protected when the conduct involved ordinary parental
authority over the child or parental discretion with respect to the pro-
vision of food, clothing, housing, medical, and dental services.
However, California was the first state to articulate the "reasonable
and prudent parent" standard in the abolition of the doctrine. In Gibson
36. Bird v. Black, 5 La. Ann. 189, 196 (1850).
37. Walker v. Milton, 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972).
38. Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
39. 40 Baylor L. Rev. 113, 117 (1988).
40. 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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v. Gibson, 41 the California Supreme Court joined other progressive ju-
risdictions in declaring that "parental immunity has become a legal
anachronism, riddled with exceptions and seriously undermined by recent
decisions of this court. Lacking the support of authority and reason,
the rule must fall." 42
Instead the court recognized that while the parent has the prerogative
and duty to exercise authority over his minor child, that prerogative
must be exercised within reasonable limits. The standard was defined
by the court as: "The standard to be applied is the traditional one of
reasonableness, but viewed in light of the parental role. Thus, we think
the proper test of a parent's conduct is this: what would an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances? ' 43
CONCLUSION
It is time for Louisiana to reexamine the justification for the con-
tinued application of the immunity in even limited circumstances. The
doctrine is being eroded and restricted rather than expanded. The ju-
risprudence is unclear as to what is the proper approach when governing
parental conduct. What is needed is an effective solution that would
balance both a child's right to be compensated for personal injuries and
a parent's right to exercise discretion in child-raising. The "reasonable
and prudent parent" standard offers that solution and should be adopted
by Louisiana Courts.
Isabel Wingerter
41. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971).
42. Id. at 916, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288, 479 P.2d at 648.
43. Id. at 921, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293, 479 P.2d at 653.
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